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L 'auteure discute des images menson- 
gk.res desfemmes et des animaux dans la 
recherche scientzffque, de l'importante 
contribution des flministes qui con- 
tinuent a critiquer La science, de 
l'exclusion des flministes de I'Ptude des 
animauxet les liens importantspreients 
entre lbppresszon d e ~  humains et des 
nnimaux. 
I am not convinced by the argu- 
ment that there is only so much 
time and money in the world 
and therefore we should con- 
centrate our efforts on alleviat- 
ing those injustices against fel- 
lowhumans. Moreover, not only 
am I not convinced by that but 
it seems to me that a great many 
of the injustices that humans 
perpetuate against animals are 
themselves deeply embedded in 
the very same systems of domi- 
humanitarianism is necessary for us 
to fully understand the complexities 
of oppression, One way to help cre- 
ate this is to look beyond our own 
species, to ensure that all relevant 
connections are being made between 
multiple and connected sites of op- 
pression. By understanding the treat- 
ment of nonhuman animals and re- 
sponding with appropriate critiques, 
we go a long way to better under- 
standing not only ourselves and the 
inequalities perpetuated within and 
between humangroups, but our com- 
plex relationships with animals and 
our very real connections to them. 
There are many similarities be- 
tween the ways in which women 
have been perceived in modern sci- 
entific inquiry, and the current per- 
ceptions and treatment ofnonhuman 
animals.' For this reason, Human- 
Animal Studies should be of particu- 
mals is the hope that women will not 
be seen as similarly part of "nature." 
Some feminists working in the area 
of animals and science are critical of 
this separationas "whatever 'animals' 
are, they are more than just whatever 
it is we wish to transcend" (Birke 
1995: 50). In this article, I will dis- 
cuss the false images of both women 
and animals in scientific research, the 
important contribution feminists 
continue to make in their critiques of 
science, the separation of feminists 
from the study of animals and the 
important connections that can be 
made between the oppression of hu- 
mans and the  oppression of 
nonhuman animals, particularly the 
attempts by some feminists to bridge 
this gap. 
Science is based, in part, on the 
notion of objectivity. As George 
Schaller states in the foreword of 
nation that lead to injustices 
against humans. (Birke, 1994: 
134) By understanding the treatment of 
When I first became interested in 
Human-Animal Studies (HAS) many 
feminist friends warned me not to get 
involved in research in this area.' 
They discussed the political reper- 
cussions of being marginalized from 
the debates that "really matteredn- 
those addressing the oppressions con- 
nected to humans. But, it seemed to 
me chat this issue fit squarely in the 
discussions and issues that feminist 
researchers continue to be interested 
in-oppression, inequality, rnarginal- 
ization, and eventual bridging. If as a 
philosophical principle, feminist re- 
searchers and activists want to create 
a truly just and fair world then we 
need to ensure that our research is 
inclusive. A truly expanded notion of 
nonhuman animals, we go a long way 
to better understanding ourselves and 
the inequalities perpetuated within 
and between human groups. 
lar interest to feminists. Women were, 
and to some extent still are, written 
about in scientific research as though 
we are at the mercy of our biology. 
Even though women and nonhuman 
animals often share the fate of being 
reduced to ourttheir biology, many 
feminists still do not fully demon- 
strate a concern for nonhuman ani- 
mals or fail to see how animals are 
related to feminist studies (Gruen). 
It may be that one of the reasons for 
this neglect and distance from ani- 
Shirley Strum's book, Almost Hu- 
man: A Journey into the World of 
Baboons: 
if a scientist takes too much vo- 
cal pride in objectivity, beware. 
Observing is subjective: the ani- 
mal is only an illustration cre- 
ated out of a personal perspec- 
tive, based on  which questions 
are raised, which facts written 
down, which information ig- 
nored. Another biologist asking 
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different questions will create a 
different animal. (xi) 
This is an important statement, 
that animals are socially constructed, 
even in science. Of  course they exist, 
flesh and blood, as we do, but hu- 
mans essentially create their "es- 
sence." This occurs not only in sci- 
ence, but also in fiction, folklore, 
popular culture, and in particular 
industries (food, clothing, and en- 
tertainment), religion, etc. Not sur- 
in the poorest taste if done regarding 
human categories (i.e., class, gender, 
race, etc.). We feel justified in our 
assumptions (scientific and other- 
wise) regarding animals with respect 
to biology that are no longer deemed 
acceptable or useful for humans. And, 
we often fail to see scientific observa- 
tion and experimentation on animals 
as political, but in fact it is extremely 
political and it can tell us a great deal 
about our relationship with nonhu- 
man animals. As Lynda Birke indi- 
Researchers indicate that there is much 
to be learned from the treatment and 
oppression of nonhuman animals 
and i t s  connection to the treatment 
of marginalized human groups. 
prisingly, nonhuman animals are 
essentially constructed to serve hu- 
man needs. We know that the social 
construction of gender and in par- 
ticular, the social construction of 
women in science, has been of par- 
ticular interest to feminist research- 
ers. Why is it then, that many femi- 
nists have been unable or unwilling 
to shift their gaze ever so slightly, 
and fully incorporate a concern for 
nonhuman animals? This is an espe- 
cially important omission as several 
researchers indicate that there is 
much to be learned from the treat- 
ment and oppression of nonhuman 
animals and its connection to the 
treatment of marginalized human 
groups, including women and girls 
(Adams, 1995, 1991; Birke, 2002; 
Kappeler; Nibert; Noske). 
Nonhuman animals are often dis- 
cussed in research and science in terms 
of generalities, especially in terms of 
species generalities. It is common, 
even in layperson conversations, to 
hear discussions that generalize about 
animals' "nature." Humans still feel 
justified in making sweeping gener- 
alizations about animals, especially 
regarding biological make-up and 
their connections to behavior, inways 
that would be considered absolutely 
cates, "[i] t is ironic that, while femi- 
nist theorists emphasize the fluidity 
of gnder ,  the same theory assumes 
an underlying fixity of nature and 
animals" (2002: 432). We humans, 
for the most part, fail to see the ways 
in which nonhuman animals are so- 
cially constructed, which often has 
more to do with our biases than their 
actual biology or the ways in which 
they are a part ofour social worlds. In 
fact, animals are a huge part of our 
social worlds, even when we fail to 
see them as such (Arluke and Sand- 
ers). 
Nonhuman animals are socially 
constructed in every area of our 
lives-in the family, in our super- 
markets and kitchens, in the cloth- 
ing, furniture, and household prod- 
ucts that we use, in the vaccines and 
medicineswe consume, and in count- 
less other areas of our lives. In sci- 
ence, nonhuman animals are socially 
constructed as research objects 
(Arluke 1994; 1988; Birke 1994; 
Phillips). Nonhuman animals used 
in scientific research are numbered 
and not named and with the new 
technologies for genetic manipula- 
tion and cloning they are viewed as 
being created by humans, not born. 
They are most often constructed for 
our benefit, not for the sake of their 
own lives, communities, and ecosys- 
tems. Nonhuman animals are often 
conceptualized only in terms of hu- 
man benefit. What or who they are 
seems to matter very little in modern 
science. 
For years, feminists sought to prove 
women's position in the cultural and 
intellectual realms of society, there- 
fore rejecting any links, or connec- 
tions, to the natural world, including 
our connections to animals (Noske). 
Barbara Noske points out, "in their 
desire to free women from this natu- 
ral object-status many feminists have 
failed to address the question of 
objectified status of nature and ani- 
mals" (1 10). Naming, for instance, is 
known to be a powerful political 
process. Both women and nonhuman 
animals, among many other group- 
ings ofhumans, have been defined as 
"other." Women have been defined 
as different and thus lesser than men, 
and nonhumans as different and thus 
lesser than humans. Within science, 
as Lynda Birke indicates, "Scientific 
naming of animals gives them a spe- 
cies and describes them as such; who 
or what they are matters little for 
these purposes" (1994: 7). In fact, 
nonhuman animals are rarely theo- 
rized in scientific inquiry as having 
individuating traits. They are deemed 
as being ruled by their biology. Birke 
also indicates 
[a] central problem with humans 
versus other animal ~ o l a r i t ~  is 
that it ignores the obvious point 
that all species are different. It is 
not just that humans are differ- 
ent from "other animals." (1994: 
94) 
As we have seen, there has been 
reluctance in modern scientific in- 
quiry to acknowledge "mindedness" 
or "conscious intention" in nonhu- 
man animals (Midgley 15). Non- 
human animals have been written 
about as though they lack emotions, 
intent and mindedness. In modern 
scientific research, nonhumans are 
perceived as scientific objects and 
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research tools (Midgley 15). Birke 
asks, "[wlhy has science been so con- 
cerned to maintain [the separation 
between human and nonhuman], 
consistently denying for years that 
other species have minds or con- 
sciousness?" (1994: 6) .  It is here, 
with its cogent critique of the 
objectification of nature that a femi- 
nist critique of science is particularly 
well suited to engage more actively 
with a concern for nonhuman ani- 
mals. 
There is a notion that is still up- 
held by many, that science is apoliti- 
cal; that it is somehow beyond social 
justice issues. Science is frequently 
presented as an objective-classless, 
raceless, genderless, nationless-en- 
deavour. In feminist critiques of sci- 
ence, the claim to objectivity on the 
part of orthodox scientists is chal- 
lenged. Likewise, race, gender, class, 
ability, sexualiry, and nationality are 
all given a place in the more broadly 
defined critical engagement with the 
scientific method. Nothing to do 
with humans is left unchallenged. 
Taking their investigations further, 
these critics seek to understand the 
issue in terms of costs and benefits; 
which groups, in which nations ben- 
efit from the flow of scientific re- 
search dollars and who precisely pays 
the related costs. By raising these 
issues, the efforts of feminist research- 
ers have gone a long way toward 
shifting the deeply held perception 
of objectivity in scientific inquiry. 
For this they are to be applauded. 
However, many feminist researchers 
continue to neglect, or only margin- 
ally examine the srudy of human- 
animal relations (Birke 2002) and 
this remains an area begging for fur- 
ther concern and research. Often 
though, it is a matter of feminist 
critiques of science not fully address- 
ing or articulating their reaction to 
the oppression of animals. 
For clarification and to help dem- 
onstrate the potential ofthis research, 
I provide the following three exam- 
ples of feminist critiques of science 
that begin to address the question of 
animal oppression, but stop short of 
fully exploring this area: 1) Some legitimate, while adv~catin~theelimi- 
feminist researchers have been criti- nation of human forms of oppres- 
cal of sex inequality in scientific re- sion. 
search. These critiques have focused 3) Even feminist critiques that ex- 
on the methods used in scientific amine "animal issues" as feminist 
research, for instance using male sub- 
jectsonly in animal testing (Harding; 
Rosser) .%ome feminist critiques ar- 
gue the need to utilize female lab 
- 
animals when conducting research, 
especially research related to women 
and girls (Rosser). What I find most 
interesting is that these critiques are 
presented without a discussion ofthe 
important larger debate-should 
animals (whether male or female) be 
used in scientific testing at all? 
- 
2) Another area of concern for 
feminists studying gender inequality 
in science is the unequal access for 
women to admission in science pro- 
grams. Sue Rosser for instance, ex- 
amines ways to transform curricu- 
lum in biology and presents strate- 
gies to try and attract women to 
science in general, and to biology in 
particular. Number 12 on the list of 
20 transformative techniques is "De- 
crease laboratory exercises in intro- 
ductory courses in which students 
must kill or render treatment that 
may be perceived as particularly 
harsh" (128). In as far as Rosser is 
issues and are critical of the use of 
animals in science, sometimes shy 
away from outright condemnation 
of the use of animals in scientific 
research. For example, Deborah Slicer 
states that: 
I am convinced that as feminist 
theorists and practitioners we 
must address the interconnect- 
ing dominations ofwomen, ani- 
mals, and nonsentient nature, as 
ecofeminists insist, along with 
other social dominations, in or- 
der to understand sufficiently 
and correct any one of them.. . . 
I realize that I have made very 
few recommendations about 
when, if ever, we may use ani- 
mals in research, although I have 
made my general antipathy to- 
ward such use clear. Nonethe- 
less, and this may be obvious, I 
still feel some ambivalence over 
the issue, a gut sense that my 
antipathy is appropriate but that 
its grounds are not yet well 
enough articulated. (109-1 10) 
"Feminist theorists must address the 
interconnecting dominations of women, 
animals. and nonsentient nature, along 
with other social dominations, in order 
to correct any one of them.. . ." 
advocating a reduction in the use of 
animals for experimentation at the 
introductory level, she is to be 
commended. But, if one of the im- 
portant roles of feminist critiques of 
science is to initiate research and 
advocate teaching from a "more ho- 
listic, global scope rather than the 
more reduced and limited scale [in 
which] problems [are] traditionally 
considered" (Rosser 128) then femi- 
nist researchers cannot reasonably 
present one form of oppression as 
Slicer finds the use of animal in 
science strongly objectionable. She 
is clearly labouring over her stance, 
but in the end is unable to fully 
articulate her position. However, she 
discusses her strong belief that femi- 
nists are well suited to investigate all 
forms of domination, including that 
of animals and nonsentient nature, 
and she invites other feminists to 
help articulate the complexities of 
issues surrounding the use of ani- 
mals in science. 
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Conclusion 
Perhaps it should not be surprising 
that many feminist researchers have 
yet to fully incorporate an ethic of 
caring for nonhuman animals, as 
Human-Animal Studies has only re- 
cently become an area of marginal 
concern in most disciplines (Shapiro). 
Some feminists doing work in the 
area of Human-Animal Studies are 
critical of feminists who have failed 
to fully incorporate concerns for 
nonhuman animals into their cri- 
tiques and research. Carol Adams, 
for example, believes that feminism 
for the most part is "a species-specific 
philosophical system, in which (an 
expanded) humanity continues to 
negate the other animals precisely 
because their otherness is located in 
the natural sphere" (1 995: 16). Oth- 
ers working in the area of feminist 
critiques of science, that incorporate 
a notion of human-animal continu- 
ity, concur. Birke believes that for the 
most part, feminism as asocial move- 
ment has "ignored issues to do with 
animals" (1995: 32). She finds that 
feminists often want to know what 
animals have got to do with women. 
Birke answers, 
[olne of the strengths of femi- 
nist thought is that it is never 
" . just" about women: it is a criti- 
cal discourse that tends to ask 
uncomfortable questions about 
everything. T o  ask questions 
about how our theorizing relates 
to what we understand of the 
natural world is as much a part of 
our remit as anything else. (34) 
During the past decade, several 
influential studies and anthologies 
have beenwritten that offer feminists 
asolid platform to continue research- 
ing our connections with animak4 
Feminist researchers are particularly 
well suited to move human-animal 
studies from the margin to the center 
of academic research activities. In the 
same way that feminist research has 
been at the forefront ofthe critique of 
modern science, we can, should, and 
I believe will be at the forefront ofthe 
debates in human-animal studies. As 
feminist researchers and activists, we 
cannot shy away from the really dif- 
ficult debates and must recognize the 
interconnections between all forms 
of inequality-whether against hu- 
man or nonhuman animals. 
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'For an overview ofthe recent discus- 
sions about the inclusion ofHuman- 
Animal Studies (HAS) into various 
disciplines, including women's stud- 
ies and feminist studies, pleasesee the 
Special 10th Anniversary Issue on 
the State of Human-Animal Studies 
in Society andAnimals 10 (4)  (2002). 
'1 must confess that I have yet to find 
a term for "animals" that fully en- 
compasses the complexities of who 
they are. According to Birke: "What- 
ever notion of 'animal' we use, it is 
always aconstruction (just as 'woman' 
is a construction)" (1995: 42). 
"Nonhuman animals" sounds like a 
qualifier, similar to saying "nonwhite" 
or "nonmale." "Animals other than 
humans" has similar connotations. 
Perhaps animals cannot and should 
not be grouped into such a broad 
category. For example, should awhale 
and a rabbit be in the same category 
or a bear and a domestic cat? There 
seems to be more differences than 
similarities and in  fact, some 
nonhuman animals are much closer 
to humans (genetically, physically and 
mentally) than they are to each other. 
In addition, it is important to recog- 
nize that as humans, we too are ani- 
mals, afact that is too often neglected 
andlor purposely ignored. For the 
purposes of this article, the terms 
"humans" and "nonhuman animals" 
will be used throughout. I recognize 
that these terms are less than ideal, 
but for the moment they remain the 
best of our limited terminology. 
3Birke discusses the fallacy of the 
"assumption that rats should be used 
to test cosmetics at all" and the omis- 
sion in most feminist critiques to 
study the power structures that allow 
scientists to continue the use, and 
justify such use, of animals in scien- 
tific methods (1995: 34). 
4This listing is not exhaustive but 
demonstrates the scope and depth of 
research being conducted by femi- 
nists in Human-Animal Studies: 
Carol Adams (1995, 1991); Carol 
Adams and Josephine Donovan; 
Lynda Birke (1994); and Greta 
Gaard. 
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